

Exhibit 61

Plaintiffs' Corrected Averment of Jurisdictional Facts and
Evidence and/or Statement of Facts as to Defendant Al Rajhi Bank
Pursuant to Rule 56.1



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

(U) FAC No. SDG-223397

(U) MEMORANDUM FOR R. RICHARD NEWCOMB
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

(U) THROUGH:

Chief, Foreign Terrorist Programs Division

(U) FROM:

Foreign Terrorist Programs Division Officer

(U) SUBJECT:

Designation of AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (AHF) branches in Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and The Netherlands, and AHF's leader AL-AQIL pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224

(U) ENTITIES:

(U) AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION Afghanistan Branch:
Afghanistan [Source: www.arriyadh.com, accessed on 12/23/2003, Exhibit 52]

(S) AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION Albania branch:
Irfan Tomini Street, #58, Tirana, Albania [redacted], Exhibit 89] (declassified)

(S) AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION Bangladesh branch:
House 1, Road 1, S-6, Uttara, Dhaka, Bangladesh [redacted] Exhibit 107] (declassified)

(S) AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION Ethiopia branch:
Woreda District 24, Kebele Section 13, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia [redacted] Exhibit 90] (declassified)

Derived from: [redacted]
Declassify on: [redacted]

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(S) ~~██████████~~ AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION The Netherlands branch
 (a.k.a. STICHTING AL HARAMAIN HUMANITARIAN AID);
 Jan Hanzenstraat 114, 1053SV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands [~~██████████~~]
 [~~██████████~~], Exhibit 108]¹ (declassified)

(U) INDIVIDUAL:

(U) Aqeel Abdelaziz AL-AQIL
 (S) ~~██████████~~ DOB: 4/29/1949
 [~~██████████~~] Exhibit 33] (declassified)

(U) INTRODUCTION:

(U) President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 (E.O.) on September 23, 2001 declaring a national emergency to address grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania,

¹ (U) The above entities are proposed for designation. Additional AHF entities, including its Headquarters, are identified below. (As discussed in the evidentiary below, some AHF entities have already been designated, or in the case of the U.S. AHF entities, blocked pending investigation. These entities are in bold and italics respectively.)

(S) ~~██████████~~ Headquarters: West Al-M'ather St.
 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
 [~~██████████~~] Exhibit 10]

(U) P.O. Box 69606
 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 11557
 [Source: www.arriyadh.com, accessed on 12/23/2003, Exhibit 52]

(S) ~~██████████~~ Additional AHF branch offices in Saudi Arabia are located in Makkah, Jeddah, Taif, Yanbu, Quway'iyah, Khamees Mushait, Dammam, Al-Ahsa, Al-Khobar, Abqaiq, Al-Khafji, Industrial Jubail, Jubail City, Tabuk and possibly elsewhere. [~~██████████~~] Exhibit 10]

(U) In the United States, AHF is located or maintains a mailing address at the following locations:

(U) 1257 Siskiyou Blvd.
 Ashland, OR 97520

(U) 3800 Highway 99 S, Ashland, OR 97520-8718
 [Source: Exhibit 88]

(U) 2151 E Division St.,
 Springfield, MO 65803
 [Source: Exhibit 87; United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for search Warrant, Exhibit 95]

(U) AHF also is located, or maintains or maintained activities in **Pakistan, Kenya, Tanzania, Indonesia**, the Philippines, Kashmir, Iran, Iraq, Burma, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia, Nepal, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, China, Yemen, India, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Palestine, Syria, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Nigeria, Djibouti, Mauritania, Ghana, Guinea, Comoros, Benin, Uganda, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Macedonia, Eritrea, Chad, Cameroon, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Belgium, Holland, France, Sweden, Australia and possibly elsewhere. [Source: AHF 2000 Annual Report in Arabic, Translation of pertinent parts, Exhibit 50; www.arriyadh.com, accessed on 12/23/2003, Exhibit 52; ~~██████████~~ Exhibit 10]

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and the Pentagon. The E.O. authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security,² and the Attorney General, to designate those persons determined to be:

- 1) (U) owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of those persons listed in the Annex to the E.O., or those determined to be subject to subsection 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d)(i) of the E.O.;
- 2) (U) assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed in the Annex to E.O. 13224 or determined to be subject to the E.O.; or
- 3) (U) associated with those persons listed in the Annex, or those persons determined to be subject to subsection 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d)(i) of the E.O.

(U) The following evidence in the files of the Office of Foreign Assets Control provides reason to believe that the above-named entities and individual satisfy the criteria for designation pursuant to Executive Order 13224, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism."

(U) OVERVIEW

(U) AL-HARAMAIN FOUNDATION (AHF)³

(S) [REDACTED] The Al Qaida-affiliated AHF offices in Bosnia and Somalia were designated on March 11, 2002 pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, March 11, 2002, Exhibit 24]⁴ At the time, the Saudi Arabia-based headquarters of the organization and other branch offices were not identified publicly as supporting terrorist activity; primarily, to allow time for the U.S. to work with Saudi authorities. [REDACTED]

on January 22, 2004, Saudi Arabia joined with the United States and designated additional AHF offices in Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania and Pakistan pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. This action was based on evidence that these branches provided support to Specially Designated Global Terrorist organizations including Al Qaida, Jemaah Islamiyah, Al-Ittihad al-Islaymiya and others. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, January 22, 2004, Exhibit 99] The administrative records supporting these designations are incorporated into this document by this reference.

(S) [REDACTED] As of March 2004, information set forth below provides reason to believe that AHF, including its headquarters and all its branch offices, is one of the principal Islamic NGO's active throughout the world providing support for the Al Qaida network and promoting militant Islamic doctrine worldwide. AHF has been infiltrated by Al Qaida and has been used by al Qaida for cover and concealment of assets and material, according to military reporting. [REDACTED]

² (U) E.O. 13224 was amended by E.O. 13284 (January 23, 2003) by adding the Secretary of Homeland Security to the consultative process.

³ (U) AHF is headquartered in Saudi Arabia and has maintained over fifty other offices throughout the world. The legal basis for OFAC to designate and block the assets of AHF in Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and The Netherlands, rests on evidence providing reason to believe that the entire AHF organization, including the activities of AHF in the locations above, meet criteria for designation pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224.

⁴ (U) Subsequent to the designation, AHF in Bosnia reopened under the name Vazir. On December 22, 2003, Vazir was designated pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. to request that the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee also list Vazir. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, December 22, 2003, Exhibit 98]

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[REDACTED] Exhibit 1; See also [REDACTED] Exhibit 2; See also [REDACTED], Exhibit 22] AHF "belongs to" the Usama Bin Ladin-established "World Front of the Jihad Against Jews and Christians," which includes the Egyptian Gama Al-Islamiya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the Abu Sayyaff Group (ASG) and the Harakat Ul Ansar of Pakistan, according to military reporting. [REDACTED] Exhibit 4; See [REDACTED] Exhibit 7] All these organizations are Specially Designated Global Terrorists pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224.

(S) [REDACTED] Prior to the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, AHF was linked to Makhtab al-Khidemat (MK), [REDACTED] Exhibit 5] MK, co-founded and financed by Usama bin Ladin (UBL), is an SDGT pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224 and the pre-cursor organization of Al Qaida. [Source: United States of America -against- Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayad, Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, Exhibit 70] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 6]

(S) As of January 2003, numerous AHF field offices and representatives operating throughout Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America appeared to be providing financial and logistical support to Al Qaida. Terrorist organizations including Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Lashkar I-Taibah are receiving funding from AHF and using AHF as a front for fundraising and operational activities. [REDACTED] Exhibit 8]

(TS) [REDACTED] In mid-April 2002, AHF was "involved with" a group of sixty Afghan persons "trained to attack Westerners," [REDACTED] Exhibit 9] Reportedly, one AHF employee believed to belong to Al Qaida is currently detained in Guantanamo, Cuba, [REDACTED]

(TS) [REDACTED] In late 2003, a journalist suspected of meeting with Al Qaida and Taliban members in Afghanistan also was suspected of transferring funds on behalf of the Al Qaida-affiliated AHF, and forwarding videotapes from Al Qaida leaders to al-Jazeera TV for broadcast. [REDACTED]

(U) AHF HEADQUARTERS CONTROL OF ORGANIZATION

(S) [REDACTED] According to the homepage for AHF in September 2002, AHF is headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and maintains 14 offices in Saudi Arabia and is active in over 50 countries. At the time, the "superintendent of all [AHF] activities" was identified as the Honorable Shaykh Saleh Ibn Abdul-Azeez Ali Shaykh, Minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, and Call and Guidance. This Shaykh was also the Chairman of AHF's Administrative Board which "follows the activities of [AHF]." AHF's Director, at least until late 2003 or early 2004, was Aqeel Abdul-Azeel [AL-AQIL]. [REDACTED] Exhibit 10]

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(S) As of January 2003, the U.S. judged that AHF's Director AL-AQIL⁵, who at the time managed AHF's business on a day-to-day basis, was providing funds to offices with terrorist ties in ways that avoided foreign government scrutiny, such as using personal bank accounts to transfer official AHF funds, according to diplomatic reporting. [redacted] Exhibit 8]

(TS) [redacted] By early 2004, AL-AQIL reportedly had been removed from his position as head of AHF, according to a variety of reporting. Yet according to a Saudi news report, AL-AQIL reportedly stated, "I resigned willingly. I wanted to give new blood a chance to assume the responsibilities, since I have personal business that I need to attend to. I have not left the organization, I have just resigned as General Manager, I will stay on as an active member and as an advisor," [redacted] AL-AQIL had reportedly been the head of AHF for over twenty years, [redacted] Exhibit 71; [redacted] Exhibit 72; [redacted] Exhibit 97; See also [redacted] Al-Hayah in Arabic, January 8, 2004, Exhibit 104]

(U) Among the reasons for AL-AQIL's removal was his "absolute centralization" of AHF, according to a Saudi news report. [Source: [redacted] Al-Hayah in Arabic, January 8, 2004, Exhibit 104] Mansour Al-Kadi, AL-AQIL's deputy and one of AHF's main leaders,⁶ cited AL-AQIL's "autocratic and centralist governance" of AHF as the main reason for his resignation, according to an Arabic language posting on an Internet forum. Though Al-Kadi is reportedly implicated in working with AL-AQIL to support Al Qaida terrorist activity,⁷ Al-Kadi's purported posting on the Internet identifies AL-AQIL as the "only individual with final decision making on spending...and the one with the authority to hire employees, even if it is just a janitor..." [Source: <http://alsaha.fares.net/>, Exhibit 106] As set forth below, the AHF headquarters, under Al-Aqil's leadership, provided funding and instructions that governed the activities of AHF throughout the world including in Bosnia, Albania, Iraq, the United States, and elsewhere.

(S) [redacted] AHF implements its tasks through its offices and representatives spread through more than 50 countries around the world. AHF maintains nine general committees and several other "active committees" that include the "Continuous Charity Committee, African Committee, Asian Committee, Da'wah and Sponsorship Committee, Masjid Committee, Seasonal Projects Committee, [AHF] Doctor's Committee, European Committee, Internet and the American Committee, the Domestic Committee, Zakaat Committee, and the Worldwide Revenue Promotion Committee," according to the AHF homepage in September 2002. [redacted] Exhibit 10]

(S) [redacted] AHF's Hisham Al-Mashari is a known operative in UBL's terrorist support network, according to the FBI. [redacted] Exhibit 21]

[redacted]

⁵ (TS) [redacted] The following additional examples identify AL-AQIL as the head of AHF. [redacted] Exhibit 42]

⁶ [redacted] Exhibit 45; [redacted] Exhibit 42; [redacted] Exhibit 46; 001094, Exhibit 47; AHF Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39;

⁷ [redacted] Exhibit 45; [redacted] Exhibit 68; [redacted] Exhibit 69]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Exhibit 12]

(TS) [REDACTED]

(TS) [REDACTED] In December 2003, an Albania-based AHF official [REDACTED] expected to receive U.S. \$17,813 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and to transfer this amount to Al-Mashari. [REDACTED]

Exhibit 55]

(S) [REDACTED]

Exhibit 116] As of March 2004, AL-AQIL, and his deputy Mansour Al-Kadi, were identified as board members of AHF in The Netherlands, according to diplomatic reporting. [REDACTED]

Exhibit 108]

(U) IRAQ and SOMALIA

(TS) [REDACTED] As early as November 2002, AHF senior official Al-Mashari had begun preparing for a post-war Iraq relief effort [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 16] As of May 2003, AHF, identified as a Saudi-based NGO with ties to Al Qaida, was reportedly pushing hard to field a platform in Iraq, which extremists could use to support anti-U.S. activities, [REDACTED]

⁸ (U) AHF's Bosnia office was designated on March 11, 2002 pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, March 11, 2002, Exhibit 24]

⁹ (U) Subsequent to the designation of AHF in Bosnia, it reopened under the name Vazir. On December 22, 2003, Vazir was designated pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. to request that the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee also list Vazir. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, December 22, 2003, Exhibit 98]

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information, to be provided to AHF's Rivadh office, on the Islamic organization being set up by the Iraq-based "Abu Saleh group," [REDACTED]

~~(TS)~~

[REDACTED] Abu Musa'ab AL-Zarqawi and the Ansar al Islam (AI) organization are Specially Designated Global Terrorists pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, September 24, 2003, Exhibit 25]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 30; See Exhibit 31; [REDACTED] Exhibit 32] The Asbat al-Ansar and Hamas organizations are Specially Designated Global Terrorists pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224.

~~(TS)~~

[REDACTED] AHF in Somalia is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. See also evidentiary supporting the designation of Zam Zam.

~~(TS)~~

[REDACTED] Exhibit 35]

~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED] In early August 2003, AHF confirmed arrangements to fund travel to Iraq for an Iraqi in Mogadishu, Somalia who was a former employee of AHF in Somalia.

~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED] Some information suggests AHF took steps to shut down some of its activities. In Somalia, as of late August 2003, [REDACTED]

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Exhibit 11]

(U) IRAN

(TS) [REDACTED] An AHF official that reportedly coordinated arms deals with the Al Qaida-affiliated Al-Zarqawi, was instrumental in establishing a branch of AHF in Iran. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The AHF branch in Iran was linked to efforts by "Wafa" to move weapons related items through Pakistan into Afghanistan during the conflict in Afghanistan in late 2001.

[REDACTED] Wafa Humanitarian Organization is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. [Source: Department of State, Public Notice 3852, Exhibit 26] [REDACTED]

(U) UNITED STATES

(U) In late 2001, the senior AHF official in the U.S., Perouz [Seda] Ghaty, sought a license from OFAC to purportedly assist Afghan refugees in border camps in Iran on the Iranian/Afghanistan border. [Source: Correspondence from Perouz Seda Ghaty to the OFAC Licensing Division, November 1, 2001, Exhibit 37] Following the dual-U.S. Embassy bombing attacks in East Africa in August 1998, Seda reportedly confided to an FBI source that he was "in trouble." When asked by the FBI source to elaborate, Seda said that he received \$500,000 from UBL-- "through Bosnia." Seda was described as a "fundamentalist" who has sought to convert prison inmates to the Islamic faith. [Source: File# 265A-NY-280350-302, Exhibit 38]

(U) As part of Seda's request to OFAC in November 2001,¹⁰ he reported that Shaykh AL-AQIL, identified as the President of AHF, agreed to Seda's proposal to fund \$500,000 for assistance to Afghan refugees in border camps in Iran. On the U.S. AFH's tax form 990 for 2001 filed with the IRS, AL-AQIL is identified as the President, Al-Kadi as the Vice President, Al-Buthe as the Treasurer, and Seda as the Secretary. [Source: AHF Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39] The U.S. AHF branch's Articles of Incorporation and application to the IRS for tax-exempt status also list AL-AQIL and Al-Kadi as members of the board of directors. [United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for search Warrant, Exhibit 95]

(TS) [REDACTED] As of March 2003, due to pressure from the U.S. on Saudi authorities to close AHF, AL-AQIL and Al-Kadi reportedly resigned from the U.S. AHF office, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On February 18, 2004, Federal law enforcement authorities executed a search warrant against property purchased on behalf of AHF in Ashland, Oregon. The search was conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation into possible

¹⁰(U) [Source: Correspondence from Perouz Seda Ghaty to the OFAC Licensing Division, November 1, 2001, Exhibit 37]

¹¹ (U) This is corroborated by a May 26, 2003 interview Seda gave to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

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violations of the Internal Revenue Code, the Money Laundering Control Act and the Bank Secrecy Act. In a separate administrative action, OFAC blocked pending investigation AHF accounts and real property in the U.S. to ensure the preservation of AHF assets pending further investigation. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, February 19, 2004, Exhibit 94; United States District Court, District of Oregon, Affidavit in Support of an Application for search Warrant, Exhibit 95]

(U) ALBANIA AND KOSOVO

(S) [REDACTED] UBL reportedly financed the establishment of AHF in Albania, which has been used as cover for terrorist activity in Albania and in Europe, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 77]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 75] In 1998, the head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in Albania was reportedly also the "accountant" for AHF in Albania, according to a French news report. [REDACTED] Paris Le Figaro in French, September 30, 1998, Exhibit 91] This individual, Ahmed Ibrahim al-Nagar, was reportedly extradited from Albania to Egypt in 1998. At his trial in Egypt, al-Nager reportedly voiced his support for UBL and Al Qaida's terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, according to Agence France Presse. [Source: Agence France Presse, February 1, 1999, Exhibit 93]

(S) [REDACTED] In January 2002, Salih Tivari, a senior official of the moderate Albanian Muslim community, was murdered. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 101]

(TS) [REDACTED] As of early September 2002, AHF was reportedly withdrawing virtually all funding to the Albanian Islamic community [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 78]

(TS) [REDACTED]

¹² (U) The National Liberation Army is designated pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13304.

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(U) OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

(S) [REDACTED] As of early June 2000, AHF in Ethiopia reportedly was providing support to AIAI, which in Ethiopia, has engaged in attacks against Ethiopian defense forces. [REDACTED]

Exhibit 85]

Exhibit 100]

(b) In [REDACTED] Sayid Nasir, an admitted terrorist planner in Indian custody since December 16, 1998, reported that he first learned of plans to attack the U.S. consulates in Chennai and Calcutta, India during a September 17, 1998 meeting at AHF in Bangladesh, according to diplomatic reporting. [REDACTED] Exhibit 62] ¹⁴

Exhibit 62] 14

(TS) [REDACTED] AHF should be determined to be subject to Executive Order 13224 for the following reasons:

- AHF is owned or controlled by, or acts for or on behalf of, or is assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, or is associated with Al Qaida.
- By providing instructions and support to AHF in Bosnia, AHF is assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of AHF in Bosnia.
- By providing instructions to AHF in Somalia, AHF is assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of AHF in Somalia.

(U) Aqeel Abdelaziz AL-AOIL

(TS) [REDACTED] AHF's founder and Director, at least until late 2003, was Aqeel Abdelaziz [AL-AQIL]. [REDACTED] Exhibit 10; The New York Times.

Exhibit 10; The New York Times.

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Exhibit 109;

Exhibit 110:

Exhibit 112

Exhibit 113;

Exhibit 114:

Exhibit 1151

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September 26, 2003, Exhibit 102] As of January 2003, the U.S. judged that AHF Director AL-AQIL¹⁵, who managed AHF's business on a day-to-day basis, was providing funds to offices with terrorist ties in ways that avoided foreign government scrutiny, such as using personal bank accounts to transfer official AHF funds, according to diplomatic reporting. [Source: [REDACTED]

Exhibit 8]

Exhibit 40;

Exhibit 45;

Exhibit 42]

AL-AQIL also is identified as AHF's President and Chairman. [Source: AHF Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39; The Sunday Oregonian, November 9, 2003, Exhibit 103; [REDACTED] Al-Hayah in Arabic, March 1, 2004, Exhibit 105]

(TS) [REDACTED] By early 2004, AL-AQIL reportedly had been removed from his position as head of AHF, according to a variety of reporting. Yet according to a Saudi news report, AL-AQIL reportedly stated, "I resigned willingly. I wanted to give new blood a chance to assume the responsibilities, since I have personal business that I need to attend to. I have not left the organization, I have just resigned as General Manager, I will stay on as an active member and as an advisor," according to diplomatic reporting. AL-AQIL had reportedly been the head of AHF for over twenty years. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 72; [REDACTED], Exhibit 97; See also [REDACTED] Al-Hayah in Arabic, January 8, 2004, Exhibit 104]

(U) Among the reasons for AL-AQIL's removal was his "absolute centralization" of AHF, according to a Saudi news report. [Source: [REDACTED] Al-Hayah in Arabic, January 8, 2004, Exhibit 104] Mansour Al-Kadi, AL-AQIL's deputy and one of AHF's main leaders,¹⁶ cited AL-AQIL's "autocratic and centralist governance" of AHF as the main reason for his resignation, according to an Arabic language posting on an Internet forum. Though Al-Kadi is reportedly implicated in working with AL-AQIL to support Al Qaida terrorist activity,¹⁷ Al-Kadi's purported posting on the Internet identifies AL-AQIL as the "only individual with final decision making on spending...and the one with the authority to hire employees, even if it is just a janitor..." [Source: <http://alsaha.fares.net/>, Exhibit 106] As set forth below, the AHF headquarters, under Al-Aqil's leadership, provided funding and instructions that governed the activities of AHF throughout the world including in Bosnia, Albania, Iraq, the United States, and elsewhere.

(TS) [REDACTED] AL-AQIL had been arrested by Saudi authorities. [REDACTED] Also in early 2004, [REDACTED] identified AL-AQIL as a suspected Al Qaida supporter that handled the collection of funds for "freedom fighters" in areas including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and Somalia, [REDACTED]

¹⁵ (TS) [REDACTED] The following additional examples identify AL-AQIL as the head of AHF. [Source:

Exhibit 40;

Exhibit 42]

¹⁶ [REDACTED] Exhibit 45;

Exhibit 42;

Exhibit 46;

Exhibit 47; AHF Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39;

¹⁷ [REDACTED] Exhibit 45;

MAR 02, Exhibit 68; [REDACTED], Exhibit 69]

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(U) AL-AQIL should be determined to be subject to Executive Order 13224 for the following reasons:

- By serving as AHF's leader, AL-AQIL controls, or acts for or on behalf of, or is assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, or is associated with AHF.

(U) Mansour bin Abdul Rahman Al-Kadi

(S) [REDACTED] Al-Kadi is identified as one of AHF's main leaders and as AL-AQIL's deputy, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Al-Kadi also is identified as AHF's Deputy Director and Vice President,
Exhibit 45; [REDACTED] Exhibit 42; [REDACTED], Exhibit 46;
Exhibit 47; AHF Tax Form 990, 2001, Exhibit 39; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

Exhibit 45]

Exhibit 69]

(S) [REDACTED] Hisham Al-Mashari

(S) [REDACTED] AHF's Hisham Al-Mashari is a known operative in UBL's terrorist support network, according to the FBI. [REDACTED] Exhibit 21]

Exhibit 12]

(TS) [REDACTED]

¹⁸ (U) AHF's Bosnia office was designated on March 11, 2002 pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, March 11, 2002, Exhibit 24]

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See also evidentiary supporting the designation of the a/k/a for AHF in Bosnia, "Vazir."

(TS/ [REDACTED] In December 2003, an Albania-based AHF official [REDACTED] expected to receive \$17,813 [REDACTED]

and to transfer this amount to Al-Mashari, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 55]

(TS/ [REDACTED] In 2000, an individual in Turkey "charg[cd]" by the United Nations as a terrorist, and who reportedly admitted engaging in militant preaching, received Al-Mashari's agreement to assist him relocate from Turkey, [REDACTED]

(S [REDACTED] Abd-al-Rahman [M.K. Al-Aqil]

(S [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 58] From mid-December 2001 through mid-March 2002, M.K. Al-Aqil reportedly transferred, [REDACTED] over \$7,600 from Saudi Arabia to a Budapest, Hungary recipient of other AHF funds transfers, according to sensitive financial data [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Exhibit 59]²⁰

¹⁹ (U) Subsequent to the designation of AHF in Bosnia, it reopened under the name Vazir. On December 22, 2003, Vazir was designated pursuant to the authorities of E.O. 13224. Saudi Arabia joined the U.S. to request that the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee also list Vazir. [Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Room, December 22, 2003, Exhibit 98]

²⁰ (S [REDACTED]

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